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The Australian Approach to Retirement Income Provision
Formal retirement income provision in Australia can be traced back to
occupational superannuation (retirement saving) schemes first offered by banks and
state governments in the 19
th century. However the year 1909 marks the beginning of a
national retirement income policy with the introduction of a means-tested age pension.
Since then retirement income provision has evolved into a multi pillar arrangement
comprising the Age Pension, occupational superannuation and other long term saving
through property, shares and managed funds. The 1990s saw the introduction of
private mandatory retirement saving in the form of the Superannuation Guarantee.
With the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee, Australia joined a growing
group of countries which centre their retirement income policy on private mandatory
retirement saving.
This paper explains and provides insights into the Australian approach to
retirement income provision. The paper is set out as follows. Section 1 provides the
historical context. Current Australian retirement income provision is discussed in
section 2. In section 3 these arrangements are assessed, while section 4 identifies
problems and offers some solutions. Section 5 concludes.
1 Historical Background: The Evolution of Private Mandating of Retirement
Provision in Australia
Traditionally, Australia relied on its Age Pension (a universal, but means-tested,
benefit payment) for retirement income provision. Entitlement is based on age,
residency status, income, and assets, but not on employment history. It is paid from
general revenues. Tax concessions for voluntary superannuation were first introduced
in 1915 and strengthened in 1936, but preservation was poor and coverage was low. As
recent as the mid-1980s, only 30% of private sector workers were covered by
occupational superannuation.
Unlike most other developed countries, Australia never introduced policies to
compel participation in a publicly provided employment or earnings-related retirement
income scheme. Prior to the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee, Australian
retirement income policy comprised only two pillars – the means tested Age Pension
and voluntary retirement saving.
Australia's status as odd man out in this regard seems to have been more a matter
of historical and political accident than of any consistent policy.  It was always
recognised that the Age Pension alone was not sufficient to fund adequate provision for
the retired in a developed and rich society such as Australia’s.  Between 1913 and 1938,
three unsuccessful attempts were made to introduce public earnings related retirement
income (social insurance) arrangements similar to those that were proving popular in
Western Europe and the Americas.  In 1938 Australia even got as far as passing the
enabling legislation, but, with the coming of the Second World War, implementation
was deferred indefinitely.
Nevertheless, occupational superannuation grew rapidly in the public sector in the
years following the Second World War. But, it was less common in the private sector
where it grew haphazardly, covering some occupations and not others and providing
markedly variable conditions and benefits. While the taxation arrangements were
concessionary, the industry was largely unregulated and benefit standards were poor.
As a result, even by the mid-1980s, less than 50% of full time employees were covered
by superannuation. Of this, private sector coverage was only around 30 % and coverage
of full time females even lower at around 25 %.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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There was renewed interest in public earnings-related retirement income provision
in the early 1970s when a commissioned study
1 also recommended a scheme along the
lines of those operating in most other OECD countries. However, this was disregarded
by the government of the time in favour of greater support for voluntary
superannuation. The trade union movement then carried the push for earnings-related
retirement income provision with the emphasis moving away from publicly provided to
multi-employer occupational arrangements.
When a Labor Government was elected in March 1983, a major part of its economic
strategy was a continuing contract with the union movement, the "Accord", which
survived through Labor’s tenure of office.  The Accord, along with Australia's then
centralised wage determination system, contained the idea of building superannuation
contributions into a national centralised wage decision.  The idea became reality in
1986, when the Accord Mark II was agreed.  A central element in that agreement was
that while the increase in compensation to employees should be 6%, to keep pace with
inflation, half of the increase would accrue in the form of a 3% employer
superannuation contribution, to be paid into an individual account in an industry fund.
This was known as productivity award superannuation.
2
The introduction of productivity award superannuation in 1986 led to large
increases in the coverage of occupational superannuation. Over the next three years, as
individual industrial award agreements were negotiated and ratified under the umbrella
of the 1986 national wage case decision, superannuation coverage increased markedly,
particularly in the private sector and in industries dominated by women, part time and
casual workers. In retail trade, an industry representative of all of these groups,
coverage grew from 24% in 1986 to 82% in 1993. Aggregate coverage nearly doubled
from 40% to 79%.
However, award superannuation proved to be difficult and costly to enforce. In
1991 the Australian industrial court rejected an application, supported by both the
government and the unions, for a further 3% increment.  The government responded by
introducing legislation requiring employers to make superannuation contributions to
an approved fund on behalf of their employees.  This policy commenced in 1992 and is
now known as the Superannuation Guarantee
Since the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee, superannuation coverage
has continued to grow, reaching 92% of employees in 2000.
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A chronology of Australian retirement income policy is set out in Appendix 1.
2 Current Retirement Income Provision in Australia
Current retirement income provision in Australia comprises three components
(or pillars). The first pillar is a universal (but targeted) Age Pension financed from
general revenues;
4 the second pillar is the slowly maturing private mandatory
retirement saving under the Superannuation Guarantee; and the third pillar is
voluntary saving, including tax-preferred superannuation. The Age Pension provided
under the first pillar is withdrawn where retirement income and assets provided under
the other pillars, exceed statutory thresholds.
                                                          
1 The Hancock Report – see Hancock (1976).
2 This agreement was subsequently ratified by the nation’s industrial court, and survived a High
Court challenge brought by the Confederation of Australian Industry questioning its
constitutionality (Dabscheck (1989), p.99).
3 A detailed discussion of the historical background can be found in Bateman and Piggott (1997)
and Bateman and Piggott (1998).
4 The Australian public Age Pension is universal to the extent that all residents of qualifying age
are eligible, but targeted to the extent that it is subject to income and assets means tests.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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Two aspects of the Australian arrangements are unusual when compared with
other private mandatory arrangements. Firstly, the first pillar Age Pension operates as
both the safety net and the second pillar guarantee, and secondly, the first pillar is
means tested against all income and assets, rather than against private pension income
only.
2.1 Australia’s Three Pillars
First pillar support - The Age Pension
5
The Age Pension commenced in 1909. For most of the period since that time it
has served as the social welfare safety net for the elderly and, in the absence of a
compulsory earnings related pillar, has provided a major source of retirement income
for most retired people. In 2000 around 80% of the retired of eligible age received some
Age Pension – of which around 66% were paid at the full rate (Dept of Family and
Community Services 2000). However, only 10% of pension recipients relied solely on the
Age Pension.
The main features of the Age Pension are summarised in Table 1.




Age (males age 65, females age 61.5 
(b))
Means tested (income and assets)
Funding General revenues
PAYG
Amounts Single rate - $A10,246.60 pa
Married rate - $A8,551.40 pa
(Subject to income and assets means tests)
Age pension indexed to greater of growth of CPI and
male average earnings.
Other  benefits Rent allowance, concessional pharmaceutical benefits,
public transport, public utilities etc.
Taxation Pensioner tax rebate fully exempts full rate age
pensioners from income tax, partial exemption for part
rate pensioners
                                                          
5 In the discussion, we ignore the distinction between the Age Pension and the Service Pension,
which is paid to ex-servicemen and women. The two pensions are very similar, except that the
Service Pension is paid five years earlier.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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Means tests Income test:
Pension withdrawn at the rate of 40c for each $A1 of
private income in excess of a free area of $A53 per week
(single rate), $A94 per week (married rate).
Assets test:
Pension withdrawn by $A1.50 per week for every
$A1,000 of assets above thresholds:
                                    Single                        Married
Homeowner              $A133,250                  $A189,500
Non homeowner       $A228,750                  $A285,000
Thresholds and limits indexed to annual, movements in
the CPI
Part pension based on whichever test determines the
lower rate of pension
(a)  These amounts are for February 2001.
(b)  The eligibility age for women was age 60. An increase to age 65 is being
implemented during the period 1995 to 2014.
The Age Pension is payable to women aged 61.5 years and over, and to men
aged 65 years and over. (The eligibility age for women is being increased to age 65 by
the year 2014). Claimants must also satisfy certain residency qualifications.  The Age
Pension is means tested in accordance with either a person’s income or, assets;
whichever determines the lower rate of pension. A higher rate of pension is payable to a
single person than to each member of a married couple.  The pension is automatically
indexed twice yearly. Since 1997, indexation has been against the greater of the growth
of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and male average earnings.
6  Assistance received
through the Age Pension is subject to personal income tax but a pensioner tax rebate is
available which fully exempts full-rate pensioners from income tax and provides partial
exemption for part-rate pensioners.
In February 2001 the Age Pension amounts were $A10,246.60 pa for single
people (around 25% average male earnings) and $A8,551.40 pa (around 20% average
male earnings) for each of a married couple.
Means Testing
Initially the Age Pension was subject to both an income test and a separate
property (assets) test. The annual rate of pension was reduced on a pound for pound
basis once earnings exceeded a free area and also by one pound for every ten pounds of
the value of property (including the family home) above a second free area. In December
1912 the family home was made exempt from the property test, and remains so.
The means tests remained largely unchanged until the late 1960s. However, the
reduction of the income test withdrawal rate from 100% to 50% in 1969 marked the
commencement of a period of liberalisation. In the 1972 election campaign, both major
parties undertook to abolish means testing for the Age Pension. Following this election
the pension free amounts were doubled and, by 1975, the means tests had been
abolished for those aged 70 and above. By 1976 the assets test was abolished.
This represented the highpoint of liberalisation of the Age Pension means tests.
In 1978 tightening of the means tests commenced when partial means testing was
introduced for persons aged 70 or more. By the mid-1980s, means testing on both
income and assets was again being applied to all retirees.
                                                          
6 Specifically male total average weekly earnings.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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Recent policy has reflected an increased emphasis on targeting. Following a
review in the 1990s, means testing was endorsed and the administration simplified.
7
Adequacy of the Age Pension
The government has legislated to maintain the single rate Age Pension at a
minimum of 25% of male average earnings.
8 As retirees solely reliant on the Age
Pension pay no income tax, this translates to a net of tax replacement rate of 37%.
Compared with other rich developed countries, these magnitudes are favourable for
safety net payments, but fall far short of the payments promised under typical public
employment related pension schemes. As Table 2 indicates, in 1991, Canada was the
only G7 nation with a higher minimum level of age benefit than Australia.
Table 2   Minimum Social Security Provision – Single Older Person –










$A8805 $A6648 $A9462 $A7899 $A6201 $A6635 $A7434
Source: Whiteford (1995).
Notes: (a) Precise estimates for Japan are not available, but the minimum value is
below the G7 average. Purchasing power parity conversions were used.
Means testing has ensured that a high proportion of government transfers are
received by the poorest aged, thereby generating significant redistribution (Bateman et al.
1994). It has also helped to keep the aggregate value of transfers modest.
Second pillar support – The Superannuation Guarantee
The Superannuation Guarantee was introduced in 1992, following the
compliance problems associated with the inclusion of superannuation in industrial
awards. The Superannuation Guarantee mandates employers to make superannuation
(retirement saving) contributions on behalf of their employees to superannuation
(pension) funds of their choice
9. Employers that fail to do so are subject to the
Superannuation Guarantee Charge.  The Superannuation Guarantee Charge comprises
the shortfall in the minimum level of superannuation support plus interest plus an
administrative cost component. It costs more to pay the Superannuation Guarantee
Charge than the mandatory contribution, not least because this Charge is not a
deductible business expense, unlike the Superannuation Guarantee. The
superannuation contributions are placed in individual accounts in private
superannuation funds and invested on behalf of the employees. Table 3 summarises
the main features of the Superannuation Guarantee.
The arrangements apply to all employers and to almost all employees.
Employees earning less than $A450 per month (around 14% of average male earnings)
are specifically excluded.
10 The mandatory contributions are fully vested (ie. the
                                                          
7 Simplification related to the application of the income and assets to retirement income streams
and the introduction of extended ‘deeming’ for financial assets. Under ’deeming’, the income to be
tested under the income test is determined by applying a statutory rate of return to the capital
value of financial assets. The 1998/99 deeming rates are 3.5% for the first $A30,800 (single
retiree)/$A51,200 (couple) and 5.5% for the remainder.
8 Increases flow-on to the married rate.
9 Superannuation is analogous to private retirement saving and superannuation funds are
analogous to pension funds. These terms may be used interchangeably throughout the paper.
10 This decision was made largely on the grounds of high administration costs on small amountAustralia by Bateman-Piggot
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member is fully entitled to all accrued benefits), fully preserved (ie. accrued benefits
must remain in a fund until the statutory preservation age for access to benefits is
reached), fully funded and must be paid into a complying superannuation fund.
11
Boards of trustees manage the superannuation funds.
The minimum level of superannuation support is being phased in. Employer
contributions commenced at 3 or 4% of earnings
12 in 1992 with the target of a 9%
contribution to be reached by July 2002.
Table 3  Features of the Australian Superannuation Guarantee
Commenced 1992







Fully vested, portable and preserved to age 55
(increasing to 60 by 2025)
No early withdrawals
Choice of lump sum, pension, annuity with tax/transfer
incentives to encourage income streams
Statutory coverage All employees aged 18-65
Earnings > $A450 month (14% average male earnings)
(b)
Self employed not covered, but tax concessions apply for
voluntary contributions
Taxation Employer contributions tax deductible
Fund income (contributions and investment earnings)
and benefits taxed at concessionary rates
Regulation Prudent man: no rate of return or asset requirements.
(a) The 9% employer contribution is being phased in over the period 1992-2002.
(b) There is a proposal to make coverage optional for employees earning between
$A450 (14% average male earnings) and $A900 a month (28% average male
earnings).
                                                                                                                                                                            
accounts. As well, the government proposes to make contributions optional for employees earning
between $A450 and $A900 per month (14-28% average male earnings).
11 Or a retirement savings account (RSA) offered by a financial institution. For public sector
employers, a government guarantee can substitute for full funding.  Defined benefit schemes can
count in meeting Superannuation Guarantee obligations provided an actuarial benefit certificate,
specifying that the implicit level of superannuation support accords with the requirements, is
obtained.
12 The initial mandatory contribution rate was 4% of earnings, although this was lower for small
firms, which commenced at 3% of earnings.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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Third pillar support – Voluntary retirement saving
Voluntary retirement saving comprises voluntary (or quasi voluntary)
occupational superannuation, personal superannuation and other forms of long
term saving through property, shares, managed investments and home-ownership.
Voluntary occupational superannuation accounted for 60% of total superannuation
contributions in 1999-00
13 with 43% of employees making voluntary or personal
superannuation contributions at an average rate of 6% of earnings. Voluntary
occupational superannuation is long standing and has traditionally been offered to
public sector workers and middle to high-income private sector workers. Benefits
are generally based on defined benefits. As well, around 85% of current retirees
own their home.
2.2 Integration of the Retirement Income Pillars
While the major source of income for most retirees is currently the Age Pension,
this will change over coming decades as more Australians reach retirement with long
periods of Superannuation Guarantee coverage.
Private Retirement Benefits
Retirement benefits accumulated under the Superannuation Guarantee and/or
voluntary superannuation may be taken as a lump sum or an income stream upon
reaching the preservation age, currently 55 but increasing to age 60 over the period to
2025.  Income streams are encouraged by tax and means test provisions, but it is
unclear whether these are affecting the long-term preference for lump sum benefits
(Bateman et al. 1993).
Currently around 75% of the value of retirement benefits are paid as lump sums,
but benefits are generally small: the 1997 ABS Retirement and Retirement Intentions
Survey reports that, in the four years prior to 1997, around 50% of lump sum
retirement payments were less than $A60,000. However, the same survey indicates that
lump sums are largely used for retirement purposes. Table 4, which sets out the
disbursement of lump sum payments for recent retirees, shows that most
superannuation payments are invested, rolled-over or used to pay off the family home.
Because superannuation accumulations do not have to be taken as a particular
type of income stream, a range of retirement income stream products have evolved.
There are three main categories – superannuation pensions, traditional annuities and
allocated pensions or annuities.
•   Superannuation pensions are pensions paid by or on behalf of superannuation
funds. They have traditionally been paid by defined benefit schemes in the public
and corporate sectors.
•   Traditional annuities are offered by life insurance companies. Current products
include fixed or indexed annuities for life or an agreed term. Around 15-20% of
gross annuity sales relates to life annuities.
•   Allocated pensions and allocated annuities (also known as phased withdrawals) are
offered by a wide range of financial institutions. Annual income payments are
required to lie between defined minimum and maximum amounts.
                                                          
13 In other words the Superannuation Guarantee accounted for 40% of total superannuation
contributions.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
8
Table 4  Disbursement of Lump Sum Payment, November 1997
Age at retirement from full-time work
65 and over
(proportion of total lump-sum benefits)
Rolled over 25.9
Purchased immediate annuity 0.8
Invested 42.0
Paid off home 12.4
Bought motor vehicle 0.8
Cleared outstanding debts 5.9
Paid for holiday 6.7
Assisted family members 0
Undecided 1.9
Other 3.8
Source: ABS Retirement and Retirement Intentions, Australia, November 1997, ABS
Cat No. 6238.0. Table 12.
Product design and demand has been driven by the differential tax and means
test arrangements applying to alternative types of income streams. Allocated products
(phased withdrawals) have been the fastest growing segment of the market in recent
years, but changes to the age pension means tests in September 1998 led to increased
demand for life and life expectancy products.
14
Integration
As noted earlier, the Age Pension provided under the first pillar is withdrawn
where retirement income and assets provided under the other pillars, exceed statutory
thresholds. The Age Pension means tests do not distinguish between mandatory private
retirement saving (the Superannuation Guarantee – the second pillar) and voluntary
retirement saving (pillar three). However, they do distinguish between the type of
retirement benefit. Where a lump sum is taken and used to purchase financial assets,
the capital value is assessed under the assets test and ‘deemed’ income is subject to the
income test.
15 Where a retirement income stream is purchased, the means tests apply
differently depending on the product type. The current rules are summarised in Table 5.
Life and life expectancy products are given greatest preference, with exemption
from the assets test and preferential income test treatment. Allocated products (phased
withdrawals) and short duration income streams are given least preference
16.
                                                          
14  In the 12 months to June 1998, gross sales of allocated products totalled $A4.3billion, over
five times that of traditional annuities.
15 A lump sum that is taken and dissipated is not counted under the means tests.
16 While life expectancy products do not provide longevity insurance, the government argues that
these are an improvement on the take up of lump sums and will get retirees thinking in terms
of income streams.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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Table 5  Retirement Income Streams – Income and Asset Tests




Income less full purchase
price/life expectancy (or
term)
Other term annuity > 5 years yes Income less full purchase
price/term





With almost all employees now covered by the Superannuation Guarantee,
many workers with additional voluntary superannuation coverage and
improvements in vesting, portability and preservation, the composition of
retirement income, and therefore the role of the public Age Pension as the major
source of income in retirement, will change in future years.
This is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the expected composition of net
total (public and private) retirement income for a full working life of
Superannuation Guarantee coverage.
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Age pension 9% Superannuation Guarantee
Source: Bateman and Piggott (1997), page 27.
(a) Assumptions: single male worker on fixed income levels between 75 % and
200 % of male average earnings, voluntary saving excluded. Net of tax replacement
rates are calculated as a percentage of pre retirement expenditure.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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2.3 Taxation and Regulation of Superannuation
With the move towards greater reliance on private provision for retirement, the
related areas of the taxation and regulation have also been reformed.
Prior to 1983 superannuation benefited from a generous tax treatment:
contributions were largely tax deductible, fund earnings were exempt from tax and only
5% of the value of a lump sum, the main form of retirement income, was included in
taxable income. However, there was little industry regulation and the vesting,
portability and preservation standards were poor.
Since the early 1980s the taxation of superannuation has been reshaped.
Taxation of lump sum benefits was introduced in 1983 and a tax on superannuation
fund income (including both contributions and investment income) in 1988. Taxation
now applies at all three possible points: contributions, fund earnings and benefits.
This contrasts with similar arrangements operating elsewhere in the world where
generally only benefits are taxed. Under the Australian arrangements, employer
contributions are tax deductible (up to age determined limits) but are taxed in the
hands of the superannuation fund at a rate of 15%.  In addition, a 15% superannuation
surcharge applies to the contributions of high-income earners. Fund earnings are taxed
at a statutory rate of 15%, which is reduced to the extent that income accrues in the
form of dividends or capital gains.
17 Retirement benefits are taxed as well, with the
amount of taxation depending on the type of benefit and its size. The taxation of
superannuation has been omitted from recent Australian tax reforms.
The 1980s also saw the introduction of a comprehensive regulatory framework
for superannuation.  As the Australian government does not have the constitutional
power to make laws concerning superannuation per se, the taxation powers were
utilised. Enforcement of the regulations was tied to tax concessions provided to
superannuation funds: a superannuation fund did not meet the regulatory
requirements did not receive the tax concessions.  An industry regulator was
established
18 and a set of operational standards for the industry was introduced.
However, when the regulatory framework was strengthened in the 1990s greater
enforcement powers were required. This time the enabling legislation was enacted
under the Australian government’s corporations and pensions power, in addition to the
taxation power. This allowed the introduction of civil and criminal remedies against
trustees who failed in their duties.
Prudential issues are largely left to superannuation fund trustees, who are
personally liable to fund members for their decisions.  Trustees are responsible for the
management, operation and investments of superannuation funds. With the exception
of a 5% of asset ceiling on in-house investments, and a “no borrowing” rule, there are
no asset requirements, nor is a minimum rate of return required. That is, the prudent
person principle applies to superannuation fund investments.
A current issue in superannuation regulation relates to the extent and form of
required disclosure of fees and charges.
2.4 The Superannuation Industry in Australia
The main institutions responsible for private mandatory retirement saving in
Australia are superannuation funds.
19 Superannuation funds operate as trusts and are
                                                          
17 Full corporate tax imputation credits are available on dividend income which may be set off
against tax on any income, including capital gains and taxable contributions, while capital gains
tax is indexed to inflation.
18 Initially the Insurance and Superannuation Commission and from July 1999, the Australian
Prudential Regulation Authority.
19 Since 1997 other institutions have been allowed to offer Retirement Savings Accounts (RSAs)
as an alternative.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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managed by boards of trustees, which are generally required to comprise equal
employee and employer representation. Other institutions such as banks, life insurance
companies and investment managers have important roles as service providers.
There are five types of superannuation fund, each introduced in response to
different historical and policy considerations. The public sector superannuation funds
appeared first in the 19
th century, followed by corporate superannuation funds for
white-collar workers. Retail funds were established by life insurance companies to
promote personal superannuation, while the introduction of award superannuation in
the 1980s and the Superannuation Guarantee in 1992 led to the introduction and
rapid growth of industry (multi employer) superannuation funds and a variant of retail
fund  - the master trust.
20 Finally, the mandatory coverage of small employers,
combined with favourable tax treatment of superannuation has led to the introduction
and growth of small (self managed) superannuation funds.
21 Superannuation funds can
either be closed (that is, membership is restricted to employees of a particular employer
or industry) or open (also called a public offer fund – where membership is open to the
general public).
In September 2000 there were 217,158 superannuation funds in Australia,
comprising 214,846 ‘small’ and 2,312 ‘other’ superannuation funds. The 100 largest
superannuation funds account for around 65% of total superannuation assets (Clare
and Connor 1999).
More recently has been the introduction of retirement savings accounts (RSAs),
which aim to provide a low cost option for small contributions. RSAs are simple capital
guaranteed products offered by banks, building societies, credit unions and life
insurance companies. They are owned and controlled by the superannuation members
holding the accounts and are taxed and regulated like all other superannuation
accounts. RSAs currently account for less than 1% of superannuation assets.
Assets and membership of the five superannuation fund types and RSAs are
summarised in Table 6.
Table 6  Characteristics of Superannuation Funds, September 2000
Types of fund Assets ($A billion) No. of funds No. of accounts
(millions)
Corporate 80 2,065 1.489
Industry 41 62 6.863
Retail 142 151 10.999
Public Sector 109 34 2.547
Small Funds 71 214,846 0.423
RSAs 




All funds 489 217,158 22.321
Source: APRA Superannuation Trends, September 2000.
Notes: (a) Retirement savings accounts are included in retail funds.
                                                          
20 Which allows non-related individuals or companies to operate superannuation under a single
trust deed.
21 Small superannuation funds have 5 or less members and are generally established by a family
owned company with family members as trustees.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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In practice trustees delegate many tasks to service providers including fund
administrators, investment managers, asset consultants, custodians and other
professionals such as lawyers, actuaries and marketing specialists. Industry estimates
indicate that nearly 86% of industry funds, 70% of public sector funds and around 60%
of corporate funds use external fund administrators.
Superannuation Assets
There has been a large increase in superannuation fund assets since the
introduction of award superannuation and the Superannuation Guarantee. Measured
as a percentage of GDP, total superannuation fund assets have grown from 2.8% in
1972, to 18.1% in 1986 to around 75% in 2000. Government estimates suggest that by
the year 2020, superannuation fund assets could total around 116.5% of GDP (Tinnion
and Rothman 1999).
In the absence of asset or rate of return restrictions, Australian superannuation
funds tend to invest in a wide variety of assets with a mix of duration and risk return
characteristics. Less than thirty percent of assets are directly invested by
superannuation funds: in September 2000 39% of assets were invested by external
investment managers and 31% in pooled superannuation funds.
The average asset allocations of Australian superannuation funds are set out in
Table 7.




Cash and deposits 34 7
Loans and placements 23 5
Interest bearing securities 91 19
Equities and units in
trusts
206 42




Source: APRA Superannuation Trends, September 2000.
Rates of Return
Aggregate rates of return of Australian superannuation funds are difficult to
determine. Not including the small self managed funds, there are over 2,300
superannuation funds. Currently none of these are required to regularly report rates of
return to a central agency and disclosure applies only to ‘open’ or public offer funds.
Further, most reported ‘rates of return’ relate to investment returns, rather than the
total return on contributions (after taking account of administration fees and charges,
taxation and any other outlays such as insurance premiums). However, some idea of
recent rates of return can be gained by reference to the performance of the ‘open’ retail
superannuation funds, as summarised in Table 8 below.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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Table 8  Performance of Master Trusts
Average returns
Fund type 1 year 2 years 3 years 5 years
Capital guaranteed 5.0 4.8 5.2 5.5
Capital stable 6.5 4.9 5.6 6.8
Cash funds 4.9 2.8 3.0 3.9
Managed 11.1 8.9 8.8 10.5
Australian shares 10.5 11.0 8.8 13.7
Fixed interest 5.2 6.2 8.1 6.9
Property 12.0 7.0 8.5 9.1
International equities 20.3 9.0 17.5 17.1
International bonds 14.1 2.7 11.4 6.7
Total products 9.1 5.6 8.3 6.9
    Source: Rice Kachor Research (2000).
Administrative Costs and Charges
Fees and charges are freely determined by superannuation funds. Therefore,
administrative charges differ between the types and particular characteristics of
superannuation funds. To provide some point of comparison, illustrative charges of the
two main destinations of Superannuation Guarantee – industry funds and master
trusts (a form of retail superannuation fund) are reported – see Table 9 below.
Table 9  Charging Schedules for Illustrative Superannuation Funds 
(a)
Average industry fund Illustrative master trust
Administration charge of $47.84 per
annum
+
 Investment management fee of
0.3-0.7% of assets
Contribution fee of up to 4.5% of
each contribution
+
Member fee of up to $42.36  to $70.80 per
annum
+
Asset administration fee of up to 0.95% of
assets
+
Investment management fee of
0.4-1.08% of assets
(a)  Estimates based on industry fund averages and illustrative master trust charges for
1998-99.
However, the charges identified above reveal little about the impact of
administrative charges over a lifetime of retirement saving. Assuming the above charges
apply over the entire accumulation period, they can be converted to standard metrics
for comparison (Bateman, Piggott and Kingston forthcoming). Under such assumptions,
Table 10 summarises the total administrative charges, expressed as a percentage of
contributions and as a percentage of assets under management, for the illustrative
superannuation funds. It is estimated that total administrative charges range from
0.37% to 0.77% of assets for industry funds and 0.41% to 1.81% of assets for retail
funds (master trusts). In other words, there is a huge divergence in charges across
funds.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
14
Table 10  Total Administrative Charges
Current charging
schedule applied to the
accumulation phase
Average industry fund Illustrative master trusts




 Source: Bateman, Kingston and Piggott (forthcoming), Table 7.7.
3  An Assessment of Australian Retirement Income Policy
As Australian retirement income policy is in transition, any assessment of that
policy must be contingent on the nature of future developments. Subject to this caveat,
however, Australian retirement income policy performs favourably when assessed
against both the individual and economy wide criteria for the performance of retirement
income arrangements.
22 More particularly the second pillar Superannuation Guarantee
performs well in the accumulation phase, because the mandatory contributions
ensures full fundedness and the private basis of the policy helps provide political
insulation (Diamond 1997). The benefits phase is much less satisfactory because
income streams are not mandatory.
Individual Criteria
An assessment of Australian retirement income policy against the financial risks
facing individuals in retirement is summarised in Table 11.
If we consider only the private mandatory retirement saving pillar (the
Superannuation Guarantee) the Australian policy scores poorly in terms of the
individual criteria, because of the lack of an income stream requirement. In particular,
longevity and inflation risks are not addressed because of the failure to require a
lifetime indexed – or indeed any - income stream.
Table 11  Assessment of the Australian Retirement Income Policy
– Individual Criteria







•   Adequate for employees only.
•   Adequate for continuous
contributions.
•   Borne by retiree, but
addressed through asset
diversification.
•   Not covered – no mandatory
purchase of lifetime income
streams, ineffective
incentives.
•   Not covered – no mandatory
•   Provides a safety net
(or cushion) against
all risks
                                                          




purchase of indexed income
streams, ineffective
incentives.
•   Accumulations are insulated
from political risk, except for
tax changes, but the public
pension safety net remains
exposed.
 
However, even if lifetime indexed income streams were required, the
Superannuation Guarantee would on its own only partially address many of the
financial risks faced by an individual in retirement. In particular, the Superannuation
Guarantee does not cover the self employed (some 12% of the total labour force) and
income replacement may be insufficient for non-standard workers.
23 As well, while
Superannuation Guarantee accumulations rest in the private sector, and are therefore
not part of the government budgetary process, they are not completely insulated from
political risk. It is open to any government to increase tax rates on accumulations
and/or benefits – as was the case with the introduction of the superannuation
surcharge
24 – or to make detrimental changes to the regulatory environment.
Many of these risks are, of course, mitigated by the interaction of the
Superannuation Guarantee with the means tested Age Pension. As well, some risks
(such as replacement or coverage risk) may be addressed through the voluntary
retirement saving pillar.
Economy-wide Criteria
Assessment of Australian retirement income policy – or more particularly the
Superannuation Guarantee - against the economy-wide criteria of efficiency, equity and
administrative efficacy is summarised in Table 12.
 




•   Addresses dynamic inconsistency of
preferences and price distortions, by
compelling saving
•   Does not address failure of annuities market
•   Enhances inter generational neutrality
•   Detrimental intra generational impacts
- low income earners forced to change
   intertemporal consumption stream
- tax concessions favour high income
earners
•   Complex to administer
•   Regulations prohibit charges on small
amount accounts
                                                          
23 For example, Tinnion and Rothman 1999 show that a single male with a full working life of
Superannuation Guarantee contributions out of average weekly earnings could expect a total net-
of-tax replacement rate of 76% from private retirement income plus the Age Pension. This
compares with a net-of-tax replacement rate of 37% from the Age Pension alone.
24 An additional tax on the contributions of high income earners. The relevance here is that
superannuation taxes are legislated separately to income taxes - and are therefore less
transparent.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
16
The Superannuation Guarantee is likely to lead to an improvement in economic
efficiency. By compelling retirement saving, it addresses myopia (along with any
dynamic inconsistency of preferences) and the intertemporal price distortions arising
from the income tax and the Age Pension. As well, it is likely to improve the composition
of saving by reducing the emphasis on home ownership. However, by failing to mandate
retirement income streams the Superannuation Guarantee does little to address the
issue of adverse selection in the annuities market.
The Superannuation Guarantee scores well on intergenerational equity. It
compels those employees with the lifetime resources to help fund their own retirement
so would be expected to reduce calls on the means tested Age Pension. This is
confirmed in Bateman and Ablett (2000) who estimate a set of generational accounts for
Australia. They find that the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee has halved
of the generational imbalance, which had previously favoured of current generations.
Within-generation distribution impacts, however, raise some concerns. First, if
the Superannuation Guarantee is largely absorbed through slower wage growth, then
the working poor may suffer more through reduced access to consumption today than
they gain through increased retirement resources tomorrow. Second, superannuation
tax concessions offer more of a tax break, relative to the comprehensive income tax, to
the rich than the poor. Finally, the Superannuation Guarantee may be disadvantageous
to non-standard workers, such as women – who have long periods out of the workforce,
more part time work and lower wages on average than men. Again, the means tested
Age Pension acts to reduce these inequities.
25
Due to the absence of a broadly accepted benchmark, the Superannuation
Guarantee’s rating on administrative efficacy is unclear. As a privately organised and
funded form of retirement income provision it is likely to be more complex and more
costly than public PAYG retirement income provision.
26 But private provision is likely to
offer more choice, better governance and the potential for higher retirement benefits.
Finally, implementation of the Superannuation Guarantee was not problem-free.
Of initial concern were the relatively high administrative charges placed on many
accounts with small balances - inevitable in an immature system - and the proliferation
of multiple accounts (around 3 for every worker).
The government responded to the former with regulations limiting the fees
charged on small amount accounts. (That is, the member protection rules which
require that for superannuation accounts of less than $A1,000, fund administration
costs cannot exceed fund earnings. Although accounts can be debited for investment
losses, contributions tax and insurance premiums.)
The latter is being addressed through member education and changes in
industry practice, which have simplified procedures for the transfer and amalgamation
of superannuation accounts. However, an emerging problem is that of ‘lost’ accounts.
The Australian Taxation Office estimates that there are about 2.5 million ‘lost’ accounts
and $A2.4 billion held on behalf of superannuation fund members who are ‘lost’ to their
fund.
Current Evidence and Projections
Preliminary evidence of the success of Australia’s three-pillar approach to
retirement income provision has focussed primarily on coverage and national saving.
                                                          
25 Equity issues and the Superannuation Guarantee are discussed in Bateman et al (1994).
26 However, while reported costs data may suggest that public arrangements are less costly,
much public cost data is deficient.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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Coverage
Figure 2 reports trends in superannuation coverage. The Superannuation
Guarantee – in conjunction with the productivity award superannuation of the 1980s –
has led to very high coverage of private retirement saving (both mandatory and
voluntary). Increases in coverage have been particularly high in industries dominated
by women, part-time and casual workers. Total coverage has grown from 39.4% of
workers in 1986 to over 92% in 2000.
Figure 2  Trends in Superannuation Coverage of Employees
Source: Employee Benefits Australia, ABS No. 6334.0; Superannuation Australia, ABS
6319.0; Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership, ABS No. 6310.0.
National Saving
Government estimates of the contribution to saving of a 9% Superannuation
Guarantee is set out in Table 13.
The Superannuation Guarantee is projected to increase national saving by 1.2%
of GDP by the turn of the century and by around 3.6% of GDP by the year 2020. Private
saving improves because of the gradually increasing tax preferred mandatory
contribution, and the earnings thereon, net of saving substitution.  However, over the
period to 2020, public saving falls, as reductions in tax revenue exceed reductions in
Age Pension outlays. This will, however, turnaround in later years as the
Superannuation Guarantee matures and the retired depend less on the Age Pension.
If these projections are correct, they reflect a major improvement in Australia’s
saving performance, which has been low by international standards.  Net national
saving currently stands at around 4.5% of GDP, so a 1.2 percentage point increase












1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
(%)
males females totalAustralia by Bateman-Piggot
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Table 13  The Superannuation Guarantee – Contribution to National Saving 
(a)
Public saving Private saving National saving
Financial year (contribution as a % GDP)
1992-93 -0.03 0.5 0.4
1995-96 -0.05 0.9 0.9
1999-00 -0.18 1.4 1.2
2004-05 -0.31 2.6 2.3
2009-10 -0.37 3.2 2.8
2014-15 -0.39 3.5 3.1
2019-20 -0.35 3.9 3.6
Source: Gallagher (1997), Table 1.
(a) Estimates assume implementation of policies announced in 1996-97 and
1997-98 Budgets, with no increase in member contributions. Various
saving substitution rates are assumed ranging from 5% for the first
income decile to 50% for the tenth income decile.
Certainly, the composition of households’ financial asset saving flows has
altered dramatically in the last decade. Table 14 reports the net acquisition of financial
assets over the past three decades. Life insurance and superannuation contributions
have increased from 20% of households’ net acquisition of financial assets in the 1970s
to 50% in the 1990s.
Table 14  Households – Net Acquisition of Financial Assets
(a)





1 9 7 0 s 4 22 03 8
1 9 8 0 s 3 63 92 5
1 9 9 0 s 2 85 02 2
Source: Bateman and Piggott (1997)
Notes: (a) Includes unincorporated enterprises.
(b) ‘Other’ includes building society and credit union deposits, government
securities, debentures, shares, unit trusts, etc.
A final point on saving performance concerns the composition (or quality) of
saving and investment.  There are two main channels of tax preferred saving in
Australia - superannuation, and owner-occupier housing.  The latter is both treated
more concessionally under the income tax and excluded from the Age Pension means
test. Therefore, in the absence of compulsory superannuation, owner-occupier housing
is likely to be chosen as the preferred personal saving vehicle.
Impact on Public Pension Outlays
The Age Pension (and the analogous service pension) currently accounts for
around 3% of GDP. This is fairly small by international standards and is largely due to
the design of the Age Pension as a means tested safety net, rather than a form of social
insurance. Government estimates suggest that, by 2050 total public age pension
outlays will reach around 4.5% of GDP (Rothman 1998)
27 – again quite low by
                                                          
27 This compares to 4.75% in the absence of the Superannuation Guarantee. It is emphasised
here that the Superannuation Guarantee was designed to complement, rather than replace,Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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international standards.. Importantly, if the mandatory contribution rate remains at 9%,
many future retirees will retain a part Age Pension.
4 Current Problems, and How Can They be Addressed?
Australia’s retirement income arrangements remain problematic in a number of
areas. These include integration of the second pillar private mandatory retirement
saving (Superannuation Guarantee) with the first pillar Age Pension and the take up of
retirement income streams, distortions and complexity associated with the taxation of
superannuation, second pillar choice, administrative costs and charges associated with
private mandating and retirement income adequacy. These issues are discussed below.
Integration with the first pillar Age Pension, and retirement income streams
Perhaps the most difficult structural problem confronting Australia’s private
mandatory second pillar (the Superannuation Guarantee) is its linkage with the first
pillar - the Age Pension - and the related question of benefit choice in retirement. Lump
sum withdrawal of superannuation benefits is both permitted and widespread. This,
combined with the disparity between the preservation age for superannuation benefits
(currently 55, but increasing to 60) and the eligibility age for the Age Pension (61.5 for
females, 65 for males), makes the integration of the Superannuation Guarantee with
the Age Pension problematic. While most retirees dispose of their lump sum benefits
prudently, they have an incentive to do so in ways that maximise their Age Pension
benefits.
28 This may involve reduced interest by workers in maximising investment
returns and means test avoidance for workers near the Age Pension threshold.
While current policy provides incentives through the Age Pension means tests to
encourage the take-up of life and life expectancy income streams, it is unclear whether
these incentives will be effective over the long term. This was shown in Bateman et al.
(1993) who found that the means test and tax incentives did little to encourage
retirement income streams.
Most analysts believe that there will eventually be compulsory annuity purchase
of some kind, although the design (a lump sum for the first $x, then compulsory
annuity purchase, or compulsory annuity purchase to $y per year, then a lump sum
option, to give two possibilities) remains unclear.
Taxation
Much avoidable complexity in the Australian taxation of retirement saving is
introduced by maintaining three tax bases: contributions, earnings, and benefits.  All
apply at concessional rates, so it is less the burden of tax than its complexity, which is
the difficulty here.  However, the tax on earnings distorts net of tax returns, adversely
affecting asset choice.  In addition, earnings taxes probably further encourage early
retirement, since it is when retirement is a viable option that the earnings tax bites
most severely, reducing the lifetime reward for working another year. As well,
contributions and earnings taxes are flat rate and therefore regressive. The
superannuation surcharge, which attempts to make the contributions tax on
superannuation funds progressive across fund members, has proved to be
administratively complex and costly.
Further, the separation of superannuation tax rates from the personal tax rate
schedule reduces the political insulation offered by private retirement provision.
29
                                                                                                                                                                            
the Age Pension.
28 See Atkinson et al. (1996).
29 For more detail on the superannuation surcharge see Bateman and Piggott (1999). For a
proposal for the simplification of superannuation taxation see Doyle et al. (1999).Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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The complexity of superannuation taxation in Australia stems from the multiple
bases on which the tax is levied.  Australia is the only country to tax all three of these
possible bases.  The best option would be to abolish the taxes on contributions and
earnings, and to tax benefits at the retiree’s marginal rate, as is done in the US for
voluntary schemes.  The implications for the current budget balance probably render
this infeasible.  An alternative might be to tax contributions at a flat rate, and tax
benefits at the retiree’s marginal rate, less the flat rate contributions tax.  Doyle et al
(1999) provide a formal analysis of this reform proposal.
Choice
Choice in the Australian policy debate has two dimensions: choice of
superannuation fund and choice of investment portfolio. Current policy reform has
emphasised choice of superannuation fund, but support for it is far from widespread.
30
There are arguments for and against greater choice. Choice of superannuation fund is
likely to lead to greater marketing to individuals. In Chile (which allows employee choice
of fund) this has proved expensive with marketing accounting for around 45% of total
administrative costs. A second negative relates to the likely, if partial, breakdown of group
life insurance arrangements. However, superannuation funds are increasingly offering
portfolio choice with more than 50% of members able to choose their investment portfolio.
Irrespective of the choice model pursued, it is vital that members are well
informed and have access to easily understood comparative performance criteria.
Therefore, government policy to facilitate greater investment choice should be
complemented by appropriate disclosure rules and effective member education.
31
Improved and uniform disclosure is currently under government consideration.
Costs and Charges
Any costs associated with superannuation (private retirement saving) will erode
the rate of return that might otherwise be realised. Expressed as a percentage of assets
under management, even charges of 1 or 2% of assets can make a major difference to
retirement accumulations.  Under the Australian retirement income arrangements,
there are a variety of difference types of superannuation funds, with differing features
and governance structures. Therefore, there can be quite different implications for costs,
charges and fees and therefore final retirement benefits. As indicated earlier in Section
2, there is currently a large difference between the administrative charges associated
with the multi employer industry funds as compared to the ‘open’ retail funds. These
factors should be taken into account in future policy concerning choice of
fund/investments, disclosure and industry structure.
                                                          
30 Draft legislation has been prepared and has been supported by the Government in Parliament,
but the Australian upper house, the Senate, has so far rejected the proposal. As the current draft
legislation stands, choice of fund must be offered to all employees receiving Superannuation
Guarantee contributions except for those employed under State awards. Under the draft legislation
an employer will be able to meet their choice of fund obligation to employees by electing one of the
three choice of fund models:
• Limited choice of at least 4 fund which must consist of at least one public offer fund, at least
one RSA,  an industry fund and an in-house corporate fund if they exist under current
arrangements; or
• Unlimited choice, which requires employees to nominate their preferred fund; or
• Negotiating a Certified Agreement or an Australian Workplace Agreement covering
superannuation between employees and employers, or, alternatively, a fund proposed by an
employee and agreed by the employer, in writing.
31 These issues are currently under consideration following the release of the Government
Consultation Paper ‘Financial Products, Service Providers and Markets – an Integrated
Framework’ (Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 1999).Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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Adequacy
While government estimates suggest that a 9% Superannuation Guarantee (plus
the Age Pension) will deliver an adequate replacement rate for retirees with continuous
workforce participation, this is no longer the norm. As well, under current policy design,
taxation and administrative charges increasingly erode the mandatory contribution.
This raises the issue of the adequacy of a mandatory contribution of 9% and whether
the mandatory policy should be supplemented by incentives to make voluntary
contributions.  Despite concerns about adequacy, there are no government proposals to
increase the mandatory contribution rate.
5 Concluding Comments
This paper has sought to explain the Australian approach to retirement income
provision. Over the past 100 years, retirement income provision in Australia has evolved
into a multi pillar arrangement comprising the Age Pension (a publicly provided safety
net), the Superannuation Guarantee (private mandatory retirement saving) and voluntary
retirement saving (including voluntary superannuation and private pensions).
The centrepiece of retirement income provision is the Superannuation Guarantee,
which commenced in 1992. Despite some early implementation problems, this is now
operating quite smoothly: superannuation coverage is around 92% of employees and
compliance is high.
In terms of the individual and economy-wide criteria for assessment, the
Australian arrangements rate well. In particular, the Superannuation Guarantee does
well in the accumulations phase, because the mandatory contributions ensure full
fundedness and the private basis of the policy helps provide political insulation. However,
it performs less well in the decumulation (benefits) phase, because retirement income
streams are not mandatory. Given the historical right to take superannuation benefits as
lump sums in Australia, mandating retirement income streams is politically difficult. In
the long term, however, the success of Australia’s current suite of retirement income
policies will depend upon the introduction of such a policy.Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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Appendix 1  Chronology of Retirement Income Policy in Australia
1909 Age Pension introduced
1913  Conservative parties proposed contributory national superannuation
1914  Introduction of tax concessions for superannuation
1922  Commonwealth employees superannuation fund established
1928  Conservative government introduced National Insurance Bill – proposed
national insurance scheme
1936  Service pension first paid. Tax concessions for lump sums introduced
1938 National Health and Pensions Insurance Bill passed – based on 1928 Bill
1943  Labour Government establishes National Welfare Fund to fund social services
1945 Social services contribution established
1950 Social services contribution merged with personal tax system
1969 Age Pension income test taper reduced from 100% to 50%
1973  Means tests abolished for persons aged over 75
1975 Means tests abolished for persons aged 70 to 74
1976  Assets test abolished for all persons
1978 Reintroduction of assets test for persons age over 70
1983  Superannuation tax changes: lump sum taxes introduced, increased tax
deductibility for employees and the self-employed.
1984  Rollover funds established. Tax concessions for annuities introduced
1985  Asset test reintroduced for all persons. Labor government and trade unions
finalise Accord Mark II
1986  3% Productivity Award Superannuation endorsed by Conciliation and
Arbitration Commission
1987  Regulatory framework for superannuation introduced – Occupational
Superannuation Supervision Act. Supervisory body established – the Insurance
and Superannuation Commission
1988  Major reforms of superannuation taxation – introduction of 15% tax on
superannuation income, reduction of lump sum taxes, 15% annuity rebate
introduced, increased tax deductibility for uncovered workers and self employed,
introduction of marginal RBL scales
1990 Age Pension means tests liberalised for pensions and annuities. Introduction of
tax rebates for superannuation contributions low coverage employees
1991 Industrial relations Commission rejects further 3% Productivity Award
Superannuation. Government announces introduction of 9% Superannuation
Guarantee to commence from July 1992Australia by Bateman-Piggot
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1992 Superannuation Guarantee commences.
1993 Superannuation Industry Supervision Act passed.
1994 Flat rate RBLs replace marginal RBLs. Age determined employer contribution
limits introduced. Improved preservation. Increased eligibility for 15% annuity
rebate. Commencement of phase-in of preservation age of 60.
1995 Commencement of phase-in of increase in Age Pension age for women from age
60 to 65. Labor government proposes to increase mandatory contributions to
15%.
1996  Deeming applied to financial investments under Age Pension income test.
Change of government. 1996-97 Budget includes proposals to introduce
retirement savings accounts (RSAs), spouse contributions, superannuation
surcharge and opt-out from Superannuation Guarantee for low income earners.
1997  RSAs established and superannuation surcharge introduced. 1997-98 Budget
includes proposals to introduce employee choice of fund and replace previous
governments proposed increased mandatory contribution rate with a 15% tax
rebate for voluntary superannuation contributions (to a max of $A3,000pa).
1998  Age Pension means tests for retirement income streams revised.
‘A New Tax System’ includes proposals to abolish 15% tax rebate and change
Age Pension income test taper to 40%.
1999  Government announces reforms of business taxation – includes proposals to
reduce the capital gains tax rate for superannuation funds to 10% and to refund
excess imputation credits.
2000 Proposals announced in ‘A New Tax System’, implemented on 1 July 2000.